

# **An Introduction to Philosophy of Educology as the Philosophy of the Future in the New Situation of Life in the World (An Essay in Philosophy of Educology)**

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## Introduction by Co-Editors

This article compares the 2002 philosophy of reality of Professor Wieslaw of Poland with that of the 1929 philosophy of reality of Professor John Dewey of the USA as they relate to the new world situation of life involving a philosophy of knowledge, specifically as they involve a philosophy of educology, i.e. a philosophy of knowledge about education, as a philosophy of the future for the new situation of life in the world.

## Introduction by the Author

The background of this paper includes references made in a paper I presented at the April 19-20, 2002 UNESCO Conference on Culture of Peace, Human Rights, and Upbringing of the Civic Society, titled, *Philosophy of Educology for Developing Democracies in the World* (1) and references made by Professor of Philosophy, Wieslaw Sztumski in his paper presented at that 2002 UNESCO Conference, titled, *Upbringing in the New Situation of Life: (Click-time Ethics as the Fundament of Upbringing in the Future)* (2).

## Part 1 The New Situation in the World

The new situation of life in the world, as conceived by Professor Sztumski, involves the imperative, as formed into the directive; *Educologists as ethicists, be responsible for philosophically inquiring into, constructing, and teaching knowledge about the good and how to best educate the people of the world with this knowledge, in that a new situation of life has developed in the world.*

What is the good and what is knowledge about the good that educologists, as ethicists, are to inquire into, construct, and teach? To understand the significance of this question, it is important to understand the circumstances in the new situation of life in the world, as characterized by Professor Sztumski. It is in the understanding of the circumstances of the new situation of life in the world that comes from the significance of the educologist's, as ethicist's, imperative, i.e. the imperative to those who do philosophy about the good, about knowledge of the good, and about how to educate the people of the world with this knowledge.

The new situation of life in the world involves circumstances in which there exists a context of meaning that includes the meanings that form knowledge constructed by the understood and accepted use of the method of experimental inquiry in science and technology in the contemporary circumstances of the new world situation of life, in contrast to its non-understood and non-accepted use in, what can be called the "classical circumstances" of the old world situation of life. Contemporarily the circumstances of the new world situation of life include the understood and accepted use of the method of experimental inquiry in science and technology, producing such meanings as forming, for example, knowledge about quantum mechanics and relativity, whereas, classically the old world situation of life did not include these circumstances.

In regard to this inclusion and exclusion of the circumstances of the understanding and acceptance of the use of the method of experimental inquiry in the new world situation of life, Sztumski says:

“ . . . in the beginning of the last century, quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity destroyed the foundations of classical physics and awakened the mistrust in stereotypes functioning in classical science and philosophy.” (3)

The point being made by Sztumski is that classical science, technology, and philosophy were not conducted with an understanding and acceptance of the method of experimental inquiry, whereas, contemporary science, technology, and philosophy are suchly conducted. Further, the point is that the contemporary conduct of science, technology, and philosophy, with the understanding and acceptance of the method of experimental inquiry, has had the consequence of awakening human doubting of, hence, thinking about, the stereotypical, i.e. established, meanings that formed knowledge claims functioning in classical science, technology, and philosophy, leading to, as Sztumski says “the rise of the consciousness of uncertainty.”

Circumstances in the new situation of life in the world have created the consciousness of uncertainty about the stereotypical, i.e. established, meanings forming classical knowledge claims, whereby, the knowledge claims have, as Sztumski states, “lost their power and are no longer adequate for the new social reality and for the modern conditions of life.” These circumstances include: (i) the “historical experiences” of “two world wars, social revolutions, dictatorships (fascist and bolshevist), the holocaust, exterminations of ethnic groups, the period of the so-called cold war (or ‘frozen peace’), and now - after September eleventh . . . - global terrorism;”; (ii) the technological “development of the production of mass-extermination weapons, the development of nuclear energy and the enormous progress in the spheres of transport, telecommunication, exploration of the cosmos, and the processes of automation, computerization, and robotization.”; and now they include (iii) “ethical canons that have lost their power.” (4)

The new situation of life in the world, then, includes the circumstances in which, according to Sztumski, speaking for the people of the world:

“ . . . we have to deal with an unusual crisis in ethics: *we have begun to live in an inter-epochal empty ethical space*. In other words, our topical life space-time has become, to some extent, devoid of its ethical dimension or this dimension is significantly reduced.” (5)

In an earlier epoch, Sztumski, points out that “ . . . people knew that the world changes” and alterates and alternates between “certainty and despair, constancy and variability, unity and plurality, harmony and contradiction,” wherein, “such attributes as constancy, certainty, unity, invariability and harmony constitute the perfection of being,” hence, “something good,” whereas, “their antinomies were acknowledged as the degeneration, as the deviation from perfection,” hence, “something bad.” (6)

Within circumstances of the world situation of life in that earlier epoch, Sztumski says, about the claims to know the good, as based on the ethic that certainty of being is the absolute good and uncertainty of being is the absolute bad, that these knowledge claims:

“ . . . survived throughout the epochs, and were even strengthened by the foundations of Christian philosophy and modern science. Always in philosophy and science one

looked for some absolutely certain fulcrum - some foundation or axiom. And, one tried to find it in the self-consciousness of man, in God, in the Mind, etc.” (7)

“The world in which we live, and in which the nearest generations will come to live, is full of changes, threats, uncertainties, and risks,” Sztumski says, along with saying that these changes, in the past:

“took place during longer intervals of time, usually in the course of a dozen or so generations. Therefore, the belief in constancy and certainty of the processes occurring in the world, in the stability of life conditions, and in the educational ideals were not questioned.” (8)

The circumstances of the new world situation of life, then, as Sztumski identifies them, include: (1) the circumstance of the existence of the interactive conjunction of the precarious and the assured that also existed in the old world situation of life of an earlier epoch; (2) the circumstance of the mode and tempo of the existence of the change, as the alteration and alternation back and forth, of the interactive conjunction of the precarious or uncertain, and the assured or certain; (3) the circumstance of the continued philosophical quest for an absolutely certain fulcrum, foundation, or axiom in the self-consciousness of man or in God or in Mind, within the tempo of the mode of existence of the conjunction, alteration, and alternation of the precarious and the assured; and, (4) the circumstance of the philosophical questioning of the educational ideals within the tempo of the mode of existence of the conjunction, alteration, and alternation of the precarious and the assured.

## Part 2

### The New Situation of life in the World and Philosophy of Educology

From the perspective of the philosophy of educology, being developed in the Institute of History and Philosophy of Educology, an initiative of Educology Research Associates/USA (ERA/USA), the circumstances of the new situation of life in the world, as Sztumski, a Polish philosopher writing in 2002, has identified, are ones that correspond with their identification by John Dewey, an American philosopher writing in 1929 in his book Experience and Nature.

In Chapter Two of this book, titled, *Existence as Precarious and as Stable*, Dewey begins the close of the chapter by saying that he has:

“selected only a few of the variety of the illustrations that might be used in support of the idea that the significant problems and issues of life and philosophy concern the rate and mode of the conjunction of the precarious and the assured, the incomplete and the finished, the repetitious and the varying, the safe and sane and the hazardous. If we trust to the evidence of experienced things, these traits, and the modes and tempos of their interaction with each other, are fundamental features of natural existence.” (9)

Dewey, in this quote, is directly calling attention to Circumstance 1, the circumstance involving the interactive conjunctive existence of the traits of the world situation of life, i.e. the conjunctive existence of: (1) the precarious or uncertain; and, (2) the assured or certain, as identified by Sztumski. Also, in this quote, Dewey calls direct attention to Circumstance 2, the circumstance identified by Sztumski involving the quick-time, or, in Sztumski's computer referencing meaning by the words 'click-time', for the mode and tempo of the change, as the alteration and alternation back and forth, of the interaction of these two conjunctive traits of the world situation of life, as experienced evidence of the reality of the fundamental features of natural existence.

Indirectly, in this quote, Dewey is calling attention to Circumstances 3 and 4 as the circumstances involving the experience of philosophically questing for certainty and questioning educational ideals by people existing as naturally integrated human beings involved in the interaction, alteration, and alternation of the two conjunctive traits of uncertainty and certainty of the world situation of life, wherein, about the experience of the two traits, as fundamental features of natural existence, Dewey, says :

“The experience of their various consequences, according as they are relatively isolated, unhappily or happily combined, is evidence that wisdom, and hence that love of wisdom which is philosophy, is concerned with choice and administration of their proportioned union. Structure and process, substance and accident, matter and energy, permanence and flux, one and many, continuity and discreteness, order and progress, law and liberty, uniformity and growth, tradition and innovation, rational will and impelling desires, proof and discover, the actual and the possible, are names given to various phases of their conjunction and the issue of living depends upon the art with which these things are adjusted to each other.” (10)

For Dewey, then, philosophy is the inquiry involved with the significant problems and issues of human beings:

"experiencing the consequences of the change, as the alteration and alternation back and forth, of the conjunctive and interactive reality of structure, as a phase of the trait in nature of the circumstance of certainty, and of process, as a phase of the trait in nature of the circumstance of uncertainty, with the question of their proportional relationship;"

and, so on through the conjunctive and interactive reality of **substance** and **accident**, **matter** and **energy**, **permanence** and **flux**, **one** and **many**, **continuity** and **discreteness**, **order** and **progress**, **law** and **liberty**, **uniformity** and **growth**, **tradition** and **innovation**, **rational will** and **impelling desires**, **proof** and **discover**, and **the actual** and **the possible**.

Philosophy, then, for Dewey, is experiential inquiry into proportional relationships between traits of the interactive, conjunctive, alterative, and alternative changing reality of the phases in life of certainty and uncertainty, not, in my opinion, as Sztumski noted, as that which has “survived throughout the epochs,” of non-experiential inquiry into absolute certainty. In Dewey’s metaphysics, absolute certainty does not exist as a trait of reality to be experienced by humans, hence, it is unknowable, whereas, the interaction, conjunction, alteration, and alternation of certainty and uncertainty does exist as a trait of reality to be experienced by humans, hence, is knowable.

Alluding to the metaphysics of the trait of absolute certainty, in relation to the traits of certainty and uncertainty in conjunction, interaction, alteration, and alternation, Dewey says that:

“While metaphysics may stop short with noting and registering these traits, man is not contemplatively detached from them. They involve him in his perplexities and troubles, and are the source of his joys and achievements.” (11)

The point being made in this quote by Dewey in 1929, it appears, is that which Sztumski makes in 2002. It is the point that, as the epochs of world situations of life moved into the epoch of the new situation of the world, the tendency by philosophers was to quest for metaphysical

knowledge of the absolutely certain trait of reality, whereas, the tendency of human beings, in general, was to actually experience the reality of the interactive, conjunctive, alterative, and alternative traits of certainty and uncertainty and quest for proportional knowledge in the interactive, conjunctive, alterative, and alternative, wherein, the experience engages these traits through the troubling feelings of perplexity in the uncertainty and the joyous feeling of achievement in the certainty.

Dewey is emphasizing that the interactively, conjunctively, alteratively, and alternatively changing traits of certainty and uncertainty, constituting the circumstances that condition organic, i.e. living, forces in the world situation of life was not and:

“... is not indifferent to man, because it forms man as a desiring, striving, thinking, feeling creature. It is not egotism that leads man from contemplative registration of these traits to interest in managing them, to intelligence and purposive art. Interest, thinking, planning, striving, consummation and frustration are a drama enacted by these forces and conditions.” (12)

For Dewey, then, existence, including human existence, involves precarious or uncertain and stable or certain conjunctive, interactive, alteratively and alternatively changing traits, and it organically and dramatically involves human desiring, striving, thinking, and feelings, as conducted, in and with the circumstances of world situations of life, with the interest of intelligently managing these conjunctive, interactive, alterative, and alternative changing traits. However, according to Dewey, it is not the motive of egotism or arbitrary choice that leads humans to this interest in intelligent management of human existence. In this regard, he says:

“A particular choice may be arbitrary; this is only to say that it does not approve itself to reflection. But choice is not arbitrary, not in a universe like this one, a world which is not finished and which has not consistently made up its mind where it is going and what it is going to do. Or, if we call it arbitrary, the arbitrariness is not ours but that of existence itself. And to call existence arbitrary or by any moral name, whether disparaging or honorific is to patronize nature.” (13)

For Dewey, existence, including human existence itself, is characterized by the organically conditioned conjunctive, interactive, alteratively, and alternatively changing traits of precariousness (uncertainty) and stability (certainty) and from this characterization it is taken that the existence of the universe, including the world, “has not consistently made up its mind where it is going and what it is going to do.” (14)

Because of the changing trait of existence, considered to be a deficiency, where the meaning of the phrase ‘to patronize’ refers to acts of condescension, i.e. to acts that disdain something or hold something in contempt for being deficient; the meaning of the phrase ‘to compensate’ refers to acts of making up for deficiencies; and, the meaning of the word ‘strait’ refers to a passage through something, Dewey continues by saying:

“To assume an attitude of condescension toward existence is perhaps a natural human compensation for the straits of life. But it is an ultimate source of the covert, uncandid and cheap in philosophy. This compensatory disposition is that which forgets that reflection exists to guide choice and effort.” (15)

And further, Dewey says, about this compensatory act of making up for deficiencies of existence, as that which is characterized by the changing trait, in relation to philosophy as the love of wisdom, that philosophy as the:

“love of wisdom is but an unlaborious transformation of existence by dialectic, instead of an opening and enlarging of the way of nature in man.” (16)

Where the meaning of the phrase “an opening and enlarging of the way of nature in man” is referenced as the latter task, Dewey concludes Chapter 2 by saying:

“A true wisdom, devoted to the latter task, discovers in thoughtful observation and experiment the method of administering the unfinished processes of existence so that frail goods shall be substantiated, secure good be extended, and precious promises of good that haunt experienced things be more liberally fulfilled.” (17)

The meaning of the word ‘existence’, then, as used by Dewey, refers to the unfinished processes involved in the organically oriented dramatic conjunction, interaction, alteratively, and alternatively changing of the circumstantial traits of the precarious (the uncertain) and the stable (the certain), aspects of the world situation of life, as they were in the near and distant past, as they are in the present, and, as they will be in the near and distant future. Existence, including that of human being as an organic and integral part of it, as Dewey conceives it, then, is unfinished and is characterized by certainty interactively, alteratively, and alternatively conjoined with uncertainty, rather than absolute certainty disjoined from uncertainty.

The good, then, in the world situation of life, according to Dewey, is not the absolute certain or stable, in disjunction from the uncertain or precarious, for such does not exist in the reality of the organically conditioned interactive, conjunctive, alterative, and alternative circumstances of the world situation of life, hence, human experience of it and knowledge about it is impossible. The good, for Dewey, is the proportional good of the certain or stable in conjunction, interaction, alteration and alternation with the uncertain or precarious. Such a proportional good does exist in the reality of the organically conditioned circumstances of the world situation of life, hence, is experientiable and experienced, and, further, is knowable and known by humans in circumstances in the world situation of life in and from experience.

About this proportional good, as the conjunction of the proportional certain with the uncertain in contrast to the absolute good, as the absolute certain in disjunction from the uncertain, Sztumski, I infer, takes it as a deficient good and takes it that knowledge about this good is deficient knowledge. The point that knowledge about the proportional good is deficient, in that it is lacking in it the knowledge about the absolute good, is made by Sztumski, when saying:

“Up until now, knowledge (especially scientific) was a guarantor of certainty. Now, such knowledge has become increasingly relative, it has lost its value of reliability and cannot warrant anything in an absolute manner. Above all, the orientation of humans resulting from knowledge about the world does not warrant the possibility of survival. On the contrary, *the greater the progress of science and technology the more risky becomes our survival.*” (18)

Where the meaning of the word ‘now’ refers to present circumstances in the new situation of life in the world, then, the meaning of the phrase ‘up until now’ refers to past circumstances in the world situation of life, and, as Sztumski implies, knowledge about the absolute certain, as

disjoined from the uncertain, existed and “guaranteed” absolute certainty, hence, absolute good, in those past circumstances, whereas, in the present circumstances, this knowledge does not exist, hence, there is no guaranteed absolute certainty as a guaranteed absolute good. And, further, without the existence and guarantee of this absolute knowledge, in the present organically conditioned interactive, conjunctive, alterative, and alternative circumstances of the new situation of life in the world, the possibility of continued human survival is not warranted, following the direct correlation of the more proportional knowledge, i.e. the more scientific knowledge, the more the risk to human survival, as a consequence, then, risk to human survival is on the increase.

It seems to me that implicit in Sztumski’s correlation of “risk,” is what Dewey, within the philosophy of pragmatism, alludes to as the “drama” of human interactive existence in the world situation of life, is the anguish, anxiety, or angst, about the “tragedy in the drama” of human existence in the world situation of life, as alluded to by Jean Paul Sartre, in the philosophy of existentialism, for as Sztumski says:

“We are not able to foresee the next direction we are to go that does not involve risk, failure, and the growth of threat. Moreover, the risk of failure increases proportionally to the speed of the changes in our environment.” (19)

From my perspective, then, the aspects of the pragmatism of Dewey that Sztumski, explicitly and implicitly, is agreeing with, are those of:

- (1) the **philosophy of existence**, including human existence, as the organic and dramatic interaction of the world situated and alteratively and alternatively changing circumstantial trait of stability in conjunction with, rather than in disjunction from, the world situated circumstantial trait of precariousness; and
- (2) the **philosophy of experience of existence**, as that of the human experience of the existence of the traits of precariousness (uncertainty) and stability (certainty) in organically conditioned circumstantial conjunction with, not in circumstantial disjunction from, the interactive, and alternatively changing world situation of life, as that of the troubling feelings of perplexity conjoined with, not disjoined from, the joyous feelings of achievement; whereby:

forming in man, as Dewey points out, the experiential acts of feeling, desiring, and striving, as integral aspects of the human experience, involved in the sometimes tragic and sometimes non-tragic drama of the human interest in the continuity of the relationships between and among frustration, planning, and consummation, as organically conditioned circumstantial forces and conditions in the new situation of life in the world.

The philosophy of existence, in terms of a conjunction of the precarious trait and the stable trait, as organically conditioned, conjoined, interactive, alterative, and alternative circumstances in the world’s new situation of life, and the philosophy of experience of existence, in terms of experiencing the troubling feelings of perplexity, as induced and experienced by the precarious trait, and the joyous feelings of achievement, as induced and experienced by the stable trait, as characterized above, within the philosophy of Dewey’s pragmatism, implies a philosophy of the knowing experience, which I make no claim of agreement between Sztumski and Dewey, but which I will elliptically develop, in the space I have left in this paper, i.e. the development of a philosophy of educology as a philosophy of the knowing experience as a philosophy for the future in the new world situation of life.

### Part 3

## Philosophy of Educology: The Philosophy of the Knowing Experience as the Educative Experience

In the pragmatic philosophical perspective, from which this paper is written, the meaning of the word 'educology', as alluded to in the background section of this paper, refers to knowledge about both the educational process, as specially conducted, for example, home, school, and community institutions, and the educative experience, as generally conducted in life in general, and, as integrated well and ill into the educational process. And, where educology is knowledge about the educative experience it is identical to knowledge about the conduct of the reflective thinking experience as the knowing or inquiring experience. Where, then, educology is knowledge about the educative experience, it is identical to knowledge about the knowing experience generally conducted as the reflective thinking experience within the organic interaction, alteration, and alternation of the conjunction of the circumstantial traits of precariousness and stability, i.e. within the existence, of the world's new situation of life.

Within the philosophy of existence and of experience of existence characterized above, as that which Sztumski and Dewey agree, the specific philosophical question about educology, as knowledge about the educative experience generally conducted as the reflective thinking experience, is, as being knowledge about the educative experience, "What is knowledge about the reflective thinking experience?"

To understand the significance of this question in regard to knowledge about the reflective thinking experience as knowledge about the educative experience, i.e. in regard to educological knowledge, it is important to understand the identification of the educative experience with the reflective thinking experience being carried one step further to that of identifying the educative experience and the reflective thinking experience with that of the inquiring experience, or inquiry, for short, the identification of which Dewey refers to in the Preface of his book titled *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, when saying:

"This book is a development of ideas regarding the nature of logical theory that were first presented, some forty years ago, in *Studies in Logical Theory*; that were somewhat summarized with special reference to education in *How We Think*. While basic ideas remain the same, there has naturally been considerable modification during the intervening years. While connection with the problematic is unchanged, express identification of reflective thought with objective inquiry makes possible, I think, a mode of statement less open to misapprehension than were the previous ones." (20)

Dewey makes the identification of the reflective thinking experience and the inquiring experience and he connects this identification with what he refers to by the meaning of the phrase 'the problematic' and with the meaning of the word 'education'. Dewey technically defines the meaning of the word 'education' in his book *Democracy and Education*, where he says:

"It is that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience." (21)

And, from the philosophy of educology perspective of this paper, the meaning of the word 'educology' refers to knowledge about the reflective thinking, i.e. the knowing or inquiry



thinking, experience used to conduct the “reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience,” as the knowing experience.

In consideration of the reference of the meaning of the phrase ‘the problematic’, it is that of a situation, as characterized earlier, i.e. a situation is that of the existence of the organic interaction, alteration, and alternation of the conjunction of the circumstantial traits of precariousness and stability, and, as Dewey says, in negative terms, a situation:

“. . . is *not* a single object or event or set of objects and events. For we never experience . . . objects and events in isolation but only in connection with a contextual whole. This latter is called a ‘situation’.” (22)

About the fact that humans experience objects and events only in the context of a situational whole, Dewey points out a fault with psychology, when it is considered from the pragmatic philosophical perspective he comes from. He says:

“Psychology has paid much attention to the question of the *process* of perception, and has for its purposes described the perceived object in terms of the results of analysis of the process. I pass over the fact that, no matter how legitimate the virtual identification of process and product may be for the special purpose of psychological theory, the identification is thoroughly dubious as a generalized ground of philosophical discussion and theory.” (23)

Dewey’s point is that psychology selectively emphasizes singular aspects of situations existing in the reality of the organic interaction, alteration, and alternation of the conjunction of the circumstantial traits of precariousness and stability in situations in the world, e.g. mentalistic psychology selectively emphasizes the singularity of mental feelings, mental images, and mental habits; behavioral psychology selectively emphasizes the singularity of physical behavior; cognitive psychology selectively emphasizes the singularity of the cognitive; and neural psychology selectively emphasizes the singularity of neurons. Psychologists single out and focus on an aspect of situations, in contrast to what educators do, as Dewey says, that of being “. . . sensitive to the quality of a situation as a whole,” where the meaning of the word ‘quality’ refers to that which “qualifies *all* the constituents to which it applies in thorough going fashion.” (24)

The meaning of the phrase ‘problematic situation’, then, refers to that kind of situation, existing in the reality of the organic interaction, alteration, and alternation of the conjunction of the circumstantial traits of precariousness and stability in the world situation of life, that is tertiarily qualified, specifically by the tertiary quality of being indeterminate, or as Dewey says, by being “disturbed, troubled, ambiguous, confused, full of conflicting tendencies, obscure, etc.” (25)

About problematic situations and these tertiary qualities as traits of a situation, Dewey continues by saying:

“It is the *situation* that has these traits. *We* are doubtful because the situation is inherently doubtful. Personal states of doubt that are evoked by and are not relative to some existential situation are pathological; when they are extreme they constitute the mania of doubting. Consequently, situations that are disturbed and troubled, confused or obscure, cannot be straightened out, cleared up and put in order, by manipulation of our personal states of mind. The attempt to settle them by such manipulation involves what psychiatrists call ‘withdrawl’ from reality.’ Such an attempt is pathological as far as it

goes, and when it goes far it is the source of some form of actual insanity. The habit of disposing of the doubtful as if it belonged only to *us* rather than to the existential situation in which we are caught and implicated is an inheritance from subjectivistic psychology. The biological antecedent conditions of an unsettled situation are involved in that state of imbalance in organic-environmental interactions. . . . Restoration of integration can be effected, in one case as in the other, only by operations which actually modify existing conditions, not by merely 'mental' processes." (26)

Where a problematic situation is an indeterminate situation, i.e. an unsettled situation, involved in the reality of the existence of the organic interaction, alteration, and alternation of the circumstantial trait of stability (certainty), in conjunction with, rather than in disjunction from, the circumstantial trait of instability (uncertainty), in the world's new situation of life, it is an indication of an imbalance of altering and alternating stability and instability in existence that induces the reflective thinking experience, as the knowing, inquiring, or reflective thinking experience, to be conducted to establish a resolved problematic situation as a determinate situation, i.e. as a settled or more stable situation, hence, restoring the integrity of the situation, using, as Dewey says, "operations which actually modify existing conditions, not by merely 'mental' processes," producing proportional, not absolute, knowledge as a proportional, not absolute, good.

For Dewey, being that knowledge: (1) is the product of the reflective thinking (knowing, inquiring, educative) experience; (2) settles (stabilizes) an unsettled (instable) situation; and (3) is proportional, rather than, absolute; it, (4) forms relations in and with aspects of the reality of the existence of the organic interaction, alteration, and alternation of the trait of the certain, in conjunction with, rather than disjunction from, the trait of the uncertain in circumstances of situations in the world, wherein, as Dewey says, within his philosophy of pragmatism, that:

"In order to avoid, negatively, the disastrous doctrinal confusion that arises from the ambiguity of the word *relation*, and in order to possess, positively, linguistic means of making clear the logical nature of the different subject-matters under discussion, I shall reserve the word *relation* to designate the kind of 'relation' which symbol-meanings bear to one another as symbol-meanings. I shall use the term *reference* to designate the kind of relation they sustain to existence; and the words *connection* (and *involvement*) to designate that kind of relation sustained by things to one another in virtue of which *inference* is possible." (27)

Knowledge, then, is proportional in that it forms *relations*, within and between the symbol-meanings, i.e. word and number meanings, that construct propositions, used to *reference* the *connection*, i.e. the *involvement*, of the things, i.e. objects and events in their significance for inference, in the organically oriented interaction of the alteratively and alternatively changing circumstantial trait of certainty, in conjunction with, rather than disjunction from, the circumstantial trait of uncertainty in the world situation of life, however, the meaning of the word 'knowledge', Dewey says:

". . . suffers from ambiguity. When it is said that attainment of knowledge, or truth, is the end of inquiry the statement . . . is a truism. That which satisfactorily terminates inquiry is, by definition, knowledge; it is knowledge because it is the appropriate close of inquiry. But the statement may be supposed, and has been supposed, to enunciate something significant instead of a tautology. As a truism, it defines knowledge *as* the outcome of competent and controlled inquiry. When, however, the statement is thought

to enunciate something significant, the case is reversed. Knowledge is then supposed to have a meaning of its own apart from connection with and reference to inquiry. The theory of inquiry is then necessarily subordinated to this meaning as a fixed external end. The opposition between the two views is basic. The idea that any knowledge in particular can be instituted apart from its being the consummation of inquiry, and that knowledge in general can be defined apart from this connection is, moreover, one of the sources of confusion in logical theory. For the different varieties of realism, idealism, and dualism have their diverse conceptions of what 'knowledge' really is. In consequence, logical theory is rendered subservient to metaphysical and epistemological preconceptions, so that interpretations of logical forms varies with underlying metaphysical assumptions." (28)

The metaphysical assumption made in the philosophy of educology perspective in this paper is that reality is the existence of the organically oriented interactive, alteratively, and alternatively changing circumstantial trait of certainty or stability in conjunction with, rather than in disjunction from, the circumstantial trait of uncertainty or instability in the world situation of life. And, the epistemological assumption made is that aspects of this conjunction, referenced by the meanings formed in the propositional construction of proportional knowledge, in contrast to absolute knowledge, as the product of the reflective thinking for knowing (inquiring) experience, is the product of the educative experience, hence, proportional knowledge is the product of the educative experience as conducted by engaging Dewey's logic as a theory of inquiry (reflective thinking, knowing, educative) experience the knowledge of which is educology.

From the perspective of philosophy of educology in this paper, with these metaphysical and epistemological assumptions, then, the meaning of the word 'educology' refers to knowledge of the logic of the conduct of the reflective thinking experience as involved in inquiry, i.e. educology is knowledge of the logic of the conduct of the thinking for knowing experience as the educative experience. Educology, then, is based on metaphysical and epistemological assumptions that provide the basis for logically and ethically guiding the human conduct of the reflective thinking experience in the reality of existence toward the end of knowing, i.e. making certain or stable, selected aspects of existence, where the meaning of the word 'existence' refers to, as characterized above, the human drama as it is involved in the organically oriented interactive, alteratively, and alternatively changing circumstantial trait of certainty or stability in conjunction with, rather than in disjunction from, the circumstantial trait of uncertainty or instability, in the world situation of life.

#### Part 4

#### Philosophy of Educology as a Philosophy of Logic and Ethics for the Future

Ironically, the philosophy of the logic of educology is the logic of the method of experimental inquiry; the very influence in the new situation in the world that Sztumski and Dewey agree exists, making it a new world situation of life, however, it is the philosophy that makes a distinction between logic, as knowledge about the pattern of experimental inquiry, and methodology, as knowledge about methods of experimental inquiry conducted within the knowledge of the logic of experimental inquiry. Whereas, the knowledge about methods of experimental inquiry has altered and influenced alteration and will continue to alter and influence alteration in existence, to resolve specifically identified problematic situations, it is the case that the knowledge about the logic of experimental inquiry remains constant through this alteration.

The methodology of, i.e. knowledge about the methods of: the physical sciences, e.g. of physics and chemistry; the bio-physical sciences, e.g. of biology and ecology; the mathematical sciences, e.g. of algebra and geometry; have altered and influenced alteration of methodology of inquiry as affected by specifically identified problematic situations involving experimental inquiry into circumstances connecting such objects and events as light, sound, atoms, molecules, genes, chromosomes, number, and lines as singularity focused subject matter of inquiry. Also, the methodology of the social sciences, e.g. of social-psychology, sociology, and anthropology has altered and influenced alteration involving methodology of experimental inquiry into circumstances connecting such objects and events as; mental feelings, images, and habits; physical individual and group behavior; human cognition; and nervous system and brain neural behavior as singularity focused subject matter of inquiry. However, in each case of the alteration of the methodology of experimental inquiry in the physical, bio-physical, mathematical, and social science knowledge producing societies, the logic of experimental inquiry has remained constant, and is the object of inquiry in the philosophy knowledge producing society of educology as unity focused subject matter of inquiry.

Whereas, the philosophy of the physical, bio-physical, mathematical, and social sciences directs the scientists in their knowledge societies to use methodology that selectively emphasizes and focuses on a single aspect, the philosophy of educology directs the philosophers in its knowledge society to use methodology that emphasizes and focuses on the unified and unifying aspects, of the logic of the reflective thinking (knowing, inquiring, educative) experience, in contrast to, but includes, the logic of the dialectical thinking (knowing, inquiring, educative) experience.

The space remaining in this paper does not permit the discussion necessary to make the distinction between these two kinds of logic, except to say that Dewey makes and uses it in his books *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* and *How We Think*, and to say that it is the logic that is based on the ethical value of human growth of the continuous and proportional betterment of the reflective thinking (knowing, inquiring, educative) experience as the good of the continuous educative experience. The logic of reflective thinking (knowing, inquiring, educative) experience is a logic that directs the reflective thinking (knowing, inquiring, educative) experience toward continuously bettering the cooperation, coordination, and correspondence among humans necessarily involved in the truthful vindication, validation, and verification experiences of the good of growth in the continuous educative experience, as conducted in the human drama, involved in the experience of existence in the new world situation of life.

Knowledge of the logic of the reflective thinking (knowing, inquiring) experience, is knowledge of the educative experience, and, is educological knowledge in a philosophical form. Educology, from the philosophy of educology perspective of this paper, is knowledge as the product of the reflective thinking (knowing, inquiring, educative) experience conducted philosophically and is the kind of knowledge indicated by Dewey in the summary of his review of the relation of philosophy to the educative experience, in the chapter titled *Philosophy of Education*, in his book *Democracy and Education*. Intending the meaning of the word 'education' to refer to the educative experience as the reflective thinking (knowing, inquiring) experience conducted in life in general, in contrast to referring to the educational process conducted in schools, from the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions, respectively, about the reality of existence and the experience of this reality, stated above in this paper, Dewey says:

“After a review designed to bring out the philosophic issues implicit in the previous discussions, philosophy was defined as the generalized theory of education. Philosophy was stated to be a form of thinking, which, like all thinking, finds its origin in what is uncertain in the subject matter of experience, which

aims to locate the nature of perplexity and to frame hypotheses for its clearing up to be tested for action. Philosophic thinking has for its differentia the fact that the uncertainties with which it deals are found in widespread social conditions and aims, consisting in a conflict of organized interests and institutional claims. Since the only way of bringing about a harmonious readjustment of the opposed tendencies is through a modification of emotional and intellectual disposition, philosophy is at once an explicit formulation of the various interests of life and a propounding of points of view and methods through which a better balance of interests may be effected. Since education is the process through which the needed transformation may be accomplished and not remain a mere hypothesis as to what is desirable, we reach a justification of the statement that philosophy is the theory of education as a deliberately constructed practice.” (29)

This knowledge being stated by Dewey is proportional, not absolute, philosophical knowledge about the reality of the organic, interactive, and the alternatively changing conjunction of the certain and uncertain circumstances of existence and the proportional good, in contrast to the absolute good, of the educative experience as the reflective thinking (knowing, inquiring) experience, and, from the philosophy of educology perspective of this paper, it is educological knowledge implying the logic of this experience and the ethics of human practice conducted in accord with the logic of this experience.

Also, from this perspective, philosophy of educology is the philosophy of the future needed to answer the question of the best education of people for conducting the successful globalization of the world in accord with Sztumski’s directive: *Educologists as ethicists, be responsible for philosophically inquiring into, constructing, and teaching knowledge about the good and how to best educate the people of the world with this knowledge, in that a new situation of life has developed in the world.*

And, also from this perspective, a model case of an educologist, as demonstrated in her paper titled *The Problem Method in Teaching Philosophy*, soon to be published in the International Journal of Educology, is Professor of Philosophy, Jurate Morkuniene. As a conclusion to my paper a quote is presented from her paper in reference to teaching, as the conduct of arranging circumstances for an educative experience in the subject matter of philosophical text for university students who exist in and are indicating a problematic situation by questions in the educational process, as conducted in a school situation in the world situation of life. Morkuniene says:

“Philosophical texts, both those belonging to the past and present, in many cases are ‘alien’ to the student, because his knowledge and experience has been accumulated . . . on a lower level of generalization in another ‘paradigm’ of teaching. It is here that a conflict appears first of all, i.e. **a problem** arises. How should I understand a strange experience and of what use is it to me? In general, is this strange text worth to be understood by me? Maybe I should only learn it (to pass the exam)? The student encounters the dilemma: first, is the text worth studying if it is not worth understanding? Second, if it is worth understanding, how should I do it?” (30)

### Notes

1. Fisher, James: *Philosophy of Educology for Developing Democracies in the World*. This paper is available through [www.era-usa.net](http://www.era-usa.net), the website for Educology Research Associates/USA (ERA/USA)

2. Sztumski, Wieslaw: *Upbringing in the New Situation of Life: Click-Time Ethics as the Fundament of Upbringing in the Future*. This paper is also available through [www.era-usa.net](http://www.era-usa.net).
3. Sztumski, pg. 4
4. Ibid, pg. 1
5. Ibid, pg. 1
6. Ibid, pg. 2
7. Ibid, pg. 3
8. Ibid, pg. 3
9. Dewey, John: *Experience and Nature*; Dover Publications, Inc., New York 10, New York, 1959, second edition, with the first edition published in 1929, pg. 75.
10. Ibid, *Experience and Nature*, pgs. 75-76
11. Ibid, pg. 76
12. Ibid, pg. 76
13. Ibid, pg. 76
14. The meaning of the word 'mind', as used by Dewey, to contrast with his meaning of the word 'consciousness', can be understood in consideration of his work in Chapter Eight, *Existence, Ideas and Consciousness*, from his book *Experience and Nature*, pgs. 303-305).
15. Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, pg. 76
16. Ibid, pg. 76
17. Ibid, pg. 76-77
18. Sztumski, pg. 4
19. Ibid, pg. 4
20. Dewey, John; *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953, Volume 12: 1938, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, pg. 3
21. Dewey, John; *Democracy and Education*, The Free Press, New York, seconded copyright in 1944 with first copyright by Macmillan Company in 1916, pg. 76
22. Dewey, John; *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, pg. 72
23. Ibid, pg. 73
24. Ibid, pg. 75
25. Ibid, pg. 109
26. Ibid, pgs. 109-110
27. Ibid, pgs. 60-61
28. Ibid, pg. 16
29. Dewey, John: *Democracy and Education*, pgs. 331-332
30. Morkuniene, Jurate; *The Problem Method in Teaching Philosophy*, a paper soon to be published in the *International Journal of Educology*, Educology Research Associates, Sydney, Australia, pg. 3. This paper is also available through [www.era-usa.net](http://www.era-usa.net).